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reader was taken aback to realize that
rather than build revulsion, the accumu-
lation of damning evidence created the
same “not my job” effect that allows na-
tions to ignore atrocities against whole
peoples.
Slim describes in detail the “seven
spheres of civilian suffering”: direct vio-
lence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and
sexual violence, forced movement, im-
poverishment, famine and disease, emo-
tional suffering, and postwar suffering.
The book’s most disturbing aspect is the
six chapters that describe the painful de-
tails about civilian killing. Only one
chapter is dedicated to promoting civil-
ian protection. This offers practical ex-
pressions of philosopher Howard
Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing
human minds as Slim’s answer to the di-
lemma: reason, research, resonance
(emotion and morality), representa-
tional redescription (shared identity), re-
sources and rewards, real world events,
and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions
as to how to apply these levers, such as
international criminal courts, fail to res-
onate with the same passion as the myr-
iad justifications for civilian killing. But
this may be the point: killing results
from the strongest passions, while the
act of sparing life results from the more
enduring, yet more difficult to evoke,
feelings of mercy, compassion, and love.
ROBERT L. PERRY
Naval War College
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Historians are charged with applying
twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents
that, at the time, seem to be only a curi-
ous combination of blurring events.
Charles Gati, a leading commentator on
Central European history and politics,
does just that in Failed Illusions, his
study of the abortive Hungarian Revo-
lution of 1956 against the Soviet Union.
His book was fifty years in the making,
partly because many of his primary
sources have only recently been made
available. Although he was a firsthand
observer of events in Hungary in the
1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure
that it reflected an appropriate level of
objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the
time of the revolution, having recently
been fired from a state-run newspaper
for no ostensible reason. While this
made him sympathetic to the revolu-
tion, he readily admits to a certain
naiveté about why it was happening.
This work is largely a result of his per-
sonal quest to retrospectively under-
stand this seminal event that shaped his
life. He emigrated to the United States
shortly after the revolution.
Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary
and the leader of the revolution, is the
story’s protagonist. Through superb us-
age of primary and personal sources,
Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic
figure. The book’s most profound in-
sights are in its handling of the decision
makers in Moscow and Washington.
Moscow possessed the ultimate power
and was responsible for the decisions
that led to the Soviet invasion of Hun-
gary in November 1956. However,
Gati’s use of recently opened records
proves conclusively that Soviet leader-
ship was not “trigger happy.” It is eye
opening to see just how close the Soviet
politburo came to allowing Hungary to
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embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The
de-Stalinization theme set by the Twen-
tieth Communist Party Congress of the
Soviet Union in February 1956 made a
major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita
Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and
even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov
seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a
significant degree of autonomy in its in-
terpretation of communism. Were it
not for the massacre of party officials in
Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati ar-
gues, the revolution stood an excellent
chance to succeed.
Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Wash-
ington. The combined incompetence of
the Central Intelligence Agency; the mis-
guided, provocative propaganda of the
Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Mu-
nich; and the White House refusal to fo-
cus on the plight of Budapest during the
Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—
encouraging the Hungarian Revolution
without any serious thought of ever sup-
porting it. This would not have been so
painful had not 96 percent of all Hun-
garians, most of whom ravenously de-
voured the RFE reports, thought that the
United States would provide unlimited
support for the revolution.
This account certainly warrants reading
by history buffs and public policy mak-
ers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing
the day-by-day accounts of the action in
Budapest that makes for an easy read.
However, the reader is left with a series
of provocative questions. What made the
Soviet politburo overturn its decision
and ultimately send in tanks to Hun-
gary? Was Washington capable of focus-
ing on more than one flash point at a
time? Would at least one fluent
Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hun-
gary have made a difference in U.S. pol-
icy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati
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Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as
professor of history at the Army Com-
mand and General Staff College. He
now offers a complete history of the po-
litical, diplomatic, and military factors
leading to President Harry S. Truman’s
April 1951 firing of General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far
East. A presentation at times overdone
for general readers, this scholarly work
will interest those who specialize in
American strategic and diplomatic deci-
sion making from post–World War II
through the Korean War.
Problems between Truman and his
viceroy in Asia began early in the Ko-
rean War. In August 1950 Truman or-
dered MacArthur to rescind a public
statement sent to the annual conven-
tion of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in
which MacArthur advocated preserving
Taiwan for a future attack on mainland
China. This statement was in direct
conflict with White House policy to
keep the war in Korea limited.
Late in December 1950, after the Chi-
nese attacked across the Yalu River in
Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint
Chiefs of Staff message with a
counterproposal. He advocated these
decisive destructive blows: a blockade
of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of
Chinese industrial capacities to wage
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